Ukraina - dewaluacja hrywny?

Popatrz jak szybko rosły stany dywizji pancernych we Francji, zgodnie z planem w 1941 roku byłoby ich juz 24 sztuki, dobrze wyposażonych i bardzo dobrze przygotowanych do walnej bitwy. Problem w tym że Niemcy nie czekali aż Francja skonsoliduje się i w 1940, wiele zresztą ryzykując swoją strategią, załatwili sprawę.

Generalnie problemem przedwojennych demokratycznych imperiów Anglii i Francji była nie tyle niechęć do wojny jak już ją wypowiedzieli tylko ogromnie długi czas do pełnej mobilizacji i pełnej wydajności przemysłu militarnego

In each of the four years 1939-1942, Britain's production of tanks, self-propelled guns,
and planes was higher than Germany's. In the first four months of the war (September-
December 1939), for example, England produced 314 tanks, while Germany produced
247. The Germans expected each military campaign to be of such brief duration that no
real economic mobilization would be necessary. This policy was successful until Hitler
bogged down in Russia in 1941, but, even there, the Fuhrer's conviction that Russia
would collapse after just one more attack delayed economic mobilization for months.

As late as September 1941, Hitler issued an order for a substantial reduction in
armaments production, and the counter-order calling for full mobilization of the German
economic system was not issued until the last day of that year. Even then the
mobilization was never total or anything like it. The captured records of the German War
Ministry for the year 1944, the year of the big effort, show that only about 33 percent of
Germany's output in that year went for direct war purposes compared to 40 percent in the
United States, and almost 45 percent in Britain. T he results of this effort in airplane
production can be seen in the fact that Germany produced almost 40,000 aircraft of all
kinds in that year 1944, while England produced almost 30,000 and the United States
produced over 96,000 military aircraft in the same year

przedwojenne demokracje były na wskroś pacyfistyczne i bardzo cięzko było przekonac pluralistyczne liberalne społeczeństwo do ogromnego wysiłku jaki był konieczny żeby w dwa-trzy lata nadrobić dystans do niesamowicie szybko zbrojących się Niemców

nie da się w rok czasu zagonić zagonić narodu do robienia czołgów

Francja i Anglia robiły co mogły żeby dogonić Niemcy i były tego bliskie

Polityka żeby w tym czasie zająć Niemcy jakimkolwiek nawet teoretycznym zagrożeniem była jedyną sensowną

For years before June 1938, the government insisted that British rearming was
progressing in a satisfactory fashion. Churchil1 and others questioned this, and produced
figures on German rearmament to prove that Britain's own progress in this field was
inadequate. These figures (which were not correct) were denied by the government, and
their own rearmament defended. As late as March 1938, Chamberlain said that British
armament were such as to make Britain an "almost terrifying power . . . on the opinion of
the world." But, as the year went on, the government adopted a quite different attitude. In
order to persuade public opinion that it was necessary to yield to Germany, the
government and its supporters pretended that its armaments were quite inadequate in
comparison with Germany.
We now know, thanks to the captured papers of the German Ministry of War, that this
was a gross exaggeration. From 1936 to the outbreak of war in 1939, German aircraft
production was not raised, but averaged 425 planes a month of all types (including
commercial). Its tank production was low, and even in 1939 was less than Britain's. In the
first nine months of 1939 Germany produced only so tanks a month; in the last four
months of 1939, in wartime, Germany produced 247 "tanks and self-propelled guns,"
compared to British production of 314 tanks in the same period. At the time of the
Munich Crisis in 1938, German had 35 infantry and 4 motorized divisions none of them
fully manned or equipped. At that time Czechoslovakia could mobilize at least 33
divisions. Moreover, the Czech Army was better trained, had far better equipment, and
had better morale and better fortifications. At that time Germany's tanks were all below lo
tons and were armed with machine guns, except for a handful of 18-ton tanks (Mark III)
armed with a 37-mm. gun. The Czechs had hundreds of 38-ton tanks armed with 75mm.
cannon. In March 1939, when Germany overran Czechoslovakia, it captured 469 of these
superior tanks along with 1,500 planes, 43,000 machine guns, and over 1 million rifles.
From every point of view this was little less than Germany had at Munich, and, at
Munich, if the British government had desired it, Germany's 39 divisions with the
possible assistance of Poland and Hungary, would have been opposed by
Czechoslovakia’s 34 divisions supported by France, Britain, and Russia.

Before leaving this subject it should perhaps be mentioned that Germany in 1939
brought into production a Mark IV tank of 23 tons armed with a 75-mm. Cannon but
obtained only 300 of the Mark III and Mark IV together before the outbreak of war in
September, 1939. In addition, it had obtained by the same date 2,700 of the inferior Mark
I and Mark II tanks which suffered breakdowns of as much as 25 percent a week. At this
same date (September 1939) Germany had an air force of 1,000 bombers and 1,050
fighters. In contrast with this, the British air program of March 1934, which emphasized
fighter planes, was to provide a first-line force of 900 planes. This was stepped up,
undrew the urging of Chamberlain, and the program of May 1938 was planned to provide
a first-line force of 2,370 planes. This was raised again in 1939. Under it, Britain
produced almost 3,000 “military” planes in 1938 and about 8,000 in 1939 compared to
3,350 “combat” planes produced in Germany in 1938 and 4,733 in 1939. Moreover, the
quality of British planes was superior to that of Germany’s. It was this margin which
made it possible for Britain to defeat Germany in the Battle of Britain in September 1940.
From these facts it is quite clear that Britain did not yield to superior force in 1938, as
was stated at the time and has been stated since by many writers, including Winston
Churchill, whose war memoirs were written two years after the Reichswehr archives
were captured. We have evidence that the Chamberlain government knew these facts but
consistently gave a contrary impression and that Lord Halifax went so far in this direction
as to call forth protests from the British military attaches in Prague and Paris.

w tych źródłach Niemcy nie mają dywizji pancernych, choć mieli już 3 gotowe i kolejne pod koniec formowania i generalnie źródło wygląda na gorsze nawet od wikipedia.pl.

At the time of the Munich Crisis in 1938, German had 35 infantry and 4 motorized divisions none of them
fully manned or equipped